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Abstract 
This paper investigates the step tolling problem in an activity-based bottleneck model in 
which activity scheduling utilities of commuters at home and at work vary by the time of day. 
The commuters choose their departure times from home to work in the morning to maximize 
their own scheduling utility. Step tolling models with homogeneous and heterogeneous 
preferences are presented. The properties of the models and the optimal step toll schemes with 
constant and linear time-varying marginal activity utilities are analytically explored and 
compared. It was found that for a given number of toll steps the efficacy of a step toll in terms 
of queuing removal rate is higher in the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal 
utilities than in the conventional bottleneck model with constant marginal utilities, and 
ignoring the preference heterogeneity of commuters would underestimate the efficacy of a 
step toll. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The bottleneck model introduced by Vickrey (1969) has been widely recognized as a useful 
tool for modeling the formation and dissipation of queuing at a bottleneck during the morning 
peak (Small, 2015). A queuing delay is a pure deadweight loss for drivers and results in 
inefficient use of the transportation infrastructure. It has been shown that a triangular and 
time-varying toll scheme can be used in the bottleneck model to totally eliminate the 
annoying queue behind the bottleneck to achieve the full social optimum. However, a 
continuously time-varying toll scheme can hardly be implemented in reality because a 
continuously changing toll structure may confuse drivers due to cognitive barrier or bounded 
rationality so that they may not be able to respond effectively to the price signals. Step toll 
(single-step or multistep) schemes have thus been adopted in practice as an approximation 
and substitute for the time-varying toll scheme. 
 
For instance, the London congestion toll pricing system has a uniform (or single-step) toll of 
£11.50 from 07:00 to 18:00 on weekdays.1 Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) 
system uses a multistep toll scheme (the Land Transport Authority (LTA) of Singapore calls it 
“shoulder pricing”), similar to those of Stockholm, the SR91 and the Bay Bridge in California, 
and the SR520 and SR16 bridges in the state of Washington. The step tolls for passenger cars 
on arterial roads in Singapore are between S$0.5 and S$3.0 (“S$” stands for Singapore’s 
currency; S$1 was approximately US$0.70 on 1 Jan 2017).2 Unlike the first-best toll scheme 
that can completely remove the queue at the bottleneck, the step tolling schemes can remove 
part of queue only. This raises an interesting and important issue: how to design an efficient 
step tolling scheme to maximize the scheduling utility of commuters, particularly when the 
commuters are divided into different classes according to their marginal work utility (or 
income level per unit of time).  
 
In the literature, the studies on step tolling in the bottleneck model can be classified into three 
categories: the ADL model of Arnott et al. (1990, 1998), the Laih model of Laih (1994, 2004), 
and the braking model of Lindsey et al. (2012) and Xiao et al. (2012). The Laih model 
implicitly assumes that separate queues exist for tolled users and untolled users who arrive 
                                                        
1 https://tfl.gov.uk/modes/driving/congestion-charge. Retrieved on 1 Jan 2017. 
2 http://www.onemotoring.com.sg/publish/onemotoring/en/on_the_roads/ERP_Rates.html. Retrieved on 1 Jan 2017. 
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after the toll is turned off. Despite this strong assumption, the Laih model is useful for 
estimating the approximate efficiency of a multistep toll scheme. The ADL model assumes 
that a mass of commuters departs just after the toll is lifted. The braking model considers that 
as the end of the tolling period approaches, drivers have an incentive to stop before reaching 
the tolling point and wait until the toll is switched off. For comprehensive reviews of the step 
tolling models, readers can refer to Lindsey et al. (2012) and van den Berg (2012, 2014). The 
Laih method is adopted in this paper because it provides a simple way to derive the optimal 
multistep toll scheme. 
 
The studies on step tolling are usually based on Vickrey’s bottleneck model, in which 
individuals have a preferred time to arrive at their destination and incur a schedule delay cost 
proportional to the amount of time that they arrive early or late. Vickrey’s bottleneck model 
treats the trip scheduling problem for the morning commute by modeling the trade-off 
between bottleneck congestion and schedule delay. It assumes that the value of travel time and 
the value of schedule delay are constants, i.e., the marginal cost of travel time and the 
marginal costs of arriving early and late at work are, respectively, assumed to be constants  , 
 , and  . Such scheduling preferences are referred to as     preferences in Knockaert 
et al. (2016). The assumption of the     preferences has been widely adopted in 
various extensions or variations of the traditional Vickrey’s bottleneck model, such as the 
ADL model, the Laih model and the braking model. It will be shown in the later section of 
this paper that the Vickrey’s bottleneck model with    preferences is actually an 
activity-based model with constant marginal activity utilities. 
 
However, some empirical studies have confirmed that the marginal utility of time for 
performing an activity at a certain location varies over time (see, e.g., Ettema and 
Timmermans, 1997, 2003; Liu et al., 2007; Tseng and Verhoef, 2008; Jenelius et al., 2011). In 
this regard, Vickrey (1973) formulated the departure time choice model for the morning 
commuting problem (also called the scheduling model of morning commute), in which the 
utilities derived from time spent at home and at work are linear functions of time. Fosgerau 
and Engelson (2011) used the linear time-varying marginal activity utilities to investigate the 
value of travel time variability. Börjesson et al. (2012) further compared the valuations of 
travel time variability with the mean-variance model and the scheduling model with linear 
time-varying marginal activity utilities. Tseng and Verhoef (2008) calibrated the scheduling 
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model of the morning commute, in which marginal utilities are allowed to vary nonlinearly 
over time. Fosgerau and de Palma (2012) presented a model with more general scheduling 
preferences to analyze commuting behavior in a city where workers live at various distances 
from the CBD. Fosgerau and Lindsey (2013) further analyzed traffic bottleneck congestion 
and commuters' trip-timing decisions when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily 
block the bottleneck. However, the properties of the scheduling model with the time-varying 
marginal activity utilities and its applications in the step tolling issues have received 
surprisingly little attention in the literature. 
 
In addition, these studies accounting for time-varying marginal activity utilities usually 
assumed that all commuters were homogeneous (i.e., only one user class), and thus the effects 
of the preference heterogeneity of commuters (i.e., multiple user classes) were not considered. 
However, studies have found that heterogeneity in trip-timing preferences is significant (see 
e.g., Small et al., 2005) and heterogeneous commuters exhibit a large behavioral difference in 
departure time choice during peak hours (see, e.g., Arnott et al., 1988; Lindsey, 2004; Wu and 
Huang, 2015) and in the response to the congestion tolls (Cohen, 1987; Arnott et al., 1994; 
Huang, 2000; Xiao et al., 2011; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011a,b; Yao et al., 2012; van den 
Berg, 2014; Wu and Huang, 2014; Chen et al., 2015). Ignoring the preference heterogeneity 
may cause a biased estimation of the efficacy of congestion tolls. It is, thus, of great 
importance to incorporate the preference heterogeneity of commuters in the congestion tolling 
problems. However, to the best of our knowledge, the existing congestion tolling studies 
considering the preference heterogeneity basically fall into the family of the     
preferences (i.e., a case with constant marginal activity utilities), and little attention has been 
paid to the case with time-varying marginal activity utilities. 
 
In light of the above, this paper studies the step tolling problem in the activity-based 
bottleneck model with time-varying marginal activity utilities. Two types of scheduling 
preferences, namely homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences, are considered. This paper 
makes three main contributions to the previous related studies. First, the closed-form solution 
of the activity-based bottleneck model with time-varying marginal activity utilities is derived, 
and its properties are analytically explored, particularly for instances in which the marginal 
activity utilities are a linear function of time. The linear marginal activity utilities can be 
considered as an approximation of any marginal activity utility functions through the 
first-order Taylor expansion. Therefore, investigation on the linear marginal activity utility 
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case may provide an avenue for evaluating the solution of the model with general scheduling 
preferences. Second, single-step and multistep toll schemes with linear time-varying marginal 
activity utilities are analytically investigated and compared with those with constant marginal 
activity utilities (i.e., traditional bottleneck model with     preferences). The results 
show that the optimal step toll scheme with linear marginal activity utilities follows a 
symmetric (or shoulder) toll structure. For a given number of toll steps, the efficacy of a step 
toll in terms of queuing removal rate is higher in the activity-based bottleneck model with 
linear marginal activity utilities than in the conventional bottleneck model with constant 
marginal activity utilities. Third, the heterogeneity of user preferences is incorporated in the 
activity-based bottleneck model and the step tolling problem. It is found that heterogeneous 
groups sequentially depart in order of decreasing marginal work utility or increasing marginal 
home activity utility, and ignoring the preference heterogeneity of commuters can cause an 
underestimation of the efficacy of a step toll. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the traditional 
bottleneck model and the associated step tolling issue are reviewed. Section 3 presents the 
activity-based bottleneck model with homogeneous preferences and its properties, particularly 
for the linear time-varying marginal activity utility case. In Section 4, the step tolling issue 
with homogeneous preferences is analytically explored. Section 5 extends it to consider the 
preference heterogeneity of commuters. Finally, Section 6 provides the conclusions and 
recommendations for further study. 
 
2. A review of the bottleneck model 
 
For completeness and comparison purposes, in this section we provide a summary 
introduction to traditional Vickrey’s bottleneck model and discuss the step tolling issue in 
such a classical bottleneck model. The former is mainly taken from Arnott et al. (1990, 1998), 
and the latter is taken from Laih (1994, 2004). 
 
Vickrey’s bottleneck model, as a stylized representation of the dynamics of traffic congestion, 
addresses the departure time choice problem of commuters during the morning peak. Suppose 
that every morning, N commuters travel from home to a workplace along a single road that 
has a bottleneck with a fixed capacity s. All of these commuters wish to arrive at their 
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workplace at an identical preferred arrival time *t . Without loss of generality, the free-flow 
travel time from home to work is assumed to be zero. Thus, a commuter arrives at the 
bottleneck immediately after leaving home and arrives at his or her workplace immediately 
after leaving the bottleneck. These assumptions do not affect the results of interest and will 
also be applied to the activity-based bottleneck model presented later. When the arrival rate at 
the bottleneck exceeds the bottleneck’s capacity, a queue develops. Those who arrive early or 
late encounter a schedule delay cost. Commuters choose their departure times on the basis of 
a trade-off between the bottleneck congestion and the schedule delay cost. 
 
Let ( )C t  represent the travel cost of commuters departing from home to work at time t. It 
consists of the travel time cost (i.e., the queuing delay cost at the bottleneck) and the schedule 
delay cost of arriving early or late. Let ( )T t  represent the travel time (or queuing delay time) 
at the bottleneck at time t. ( )C t  can then be expressed as 
   * *( ) ( ) max 0, ( ) max 0, ( )C t T t t t T t t T t t         , (1) 
where   is the unit cost of travel time,   is the unit cost of arriving early, and   is the 
unit cost of arriving late. Following the empirical study of Small (1982), the relationship 
  should hold. 
 
The queuing delay time ( )T t  at the bottleneck at time t equals the queue length ( )D t  
divided by the bottleneck capacity s, i.e., ( ) ( )T t D t s , where ( )D t  equals the difference 
between the cumulative arrivals and cumulative departures by that time, i.e., 
 ( ) ( )
q
t
qt
D t r t dt s t t   , (2) 
where ( )r t  is the departure rate of commuters from home at time t and qt  is the time at 
which the queue begins. 
 
At the equilibrium, all commuters experience the same travel cost ( )C t  in the morning peak 
period regardless of their departure times. This means ( ) 0,  ( , )q qdC t dt t t t    , where qt   
is the time when the queue ends and ( , )q qt t   is the morning peak period. Hence, one can 
easily derive the equilibrium departure rate ( )r t  as 
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,   ( , ),
( )
,   ( , ),
q
q
s t t t
r t
s t t t 
         


 (3) 
where t  denotes the departure time from home at which a commuter can arrive at workplace 
on time, i.e., *( )t T t t   . For the purposes of illustration, Fig. 1a depicts the equilibrium 
departure rate of commuters in the morning peak period, which is piecewise constant. Fig. 1b 
plots the cumulative departures from home and the cumulative arrivals at workplace. The 
cumulative departure curve is piecewise linear. 
 
In the morning peak ( , )q qt t  , the capacity of the bottleneck is reached, and thus q qt t N s    
holds. At the equilibrium, the first and last commuters do not face a queue, their queuing 
delays are zero, and their schedule delay costs must thus be equal, expressed as 
   * *q qt t t t     . (4) 
 
From Eq. (4) together with q qt t N s    and *( )t T t t   , one obtains 
*
q
Nt t
s
    , 
*
q
Nt t
s
    , and  *
Nt t
s
     . (5) 
 
The resultant equilibrium travel cost C  is 
NC
s
   .  (6) 
 
From equilibrium condition ( ) ( ) ( )q qC t C t C t    and Eqs. (1) and (4), we can derive the 
queuing delay time as 
( ),   [ , ],
( )
( ),   [ , ].
q q
q q
t t t t t
T t
t t t t t 
           


 (7) 
Eq. (7) shows that a queue builds up linearly from qt  to t  and then dissipates linearly until 
it disappears at qt  . Fig. 1c depicts the change of the queuing delay time ( )T t  during the 
morning peak ( , )q qt t  . It can be noted that the queuing delay curve (also referred to as isocost 
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queuing curve in Cohen (1987)) is piecewise linear. 
 
A queuing delay is a pure deadweight loss in the bottleneck model. At the social optimum (i.e., 
the first-best) situation, queuing at the bottleneck should be eliminated and the capacity of the 
bottleneck should be fully utilized. To do so, the optimal (first-best) time-varying tolls can be 
imposed to replace the queuing delay such that the no-toll user equilibrium can automatically 
be driven to the social optimum. The social optimum time-varying congestion tolls are 
presented as follows. 
* *
* *
( ),   [ , ],
( )
( ),   [ , ],
q
q
N t t t t t
s
t
N t t t t t
s 
            
 (8) 
where ( )t  denotes the congestion toll at the bottleneck at time t. 
 
Remark 1. According to Eqs. (7) and (8), one can easily derive the following relationship: 
*
*
,   ( , ),( )
( ) ,   ( , ).
q
q
t t tt
T t t t t 
       
 (9) 
This means that decreasing one unit of queuing time at the bottleneck requires increasing the 
tolls by (  ) units for early arrival period, and (   ) units for late arrival period. 
 
As previously stated, cognitive barrier or bounded rationality of commuters makes the 
continuously time-varying toll scheme difficult to implement in reality. Therefore, step tolling 
(single-step or multistep) schemes are usually adopted in practice. Laih (1994) indicated the 
properties of the step toll schemes in Vickrey’s bottleneck model as follows. 
 
Lemma 1. The optimal m-step toll scheme divides the maximum optimal time-varying toll 
into ( 1)m  equal amounts and eliminates at most ( 1)m m   of the total queuing delay that 
exists under the no-toll equilibrium. 
 
For the purposes of illustration, Figs. 2a and 2b indicate the optimal single-step and two-step 
toll systems for the Laih model. It can be noted that the single-step toll is half the maximum 
optimal time-varying toll max
N
s
    , causing a removal of half the total queuing delay 
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under the no-toll equilibrium. The two-step tolls are one third and two thirds of the maximum 
optimal time-varying toll max , respectively. As a result, two thirds of the total queuing delay 
under the no-toll equilibrium is removed. For more details, readers can refer to Laih (1994). 
 
3. Activity-based bottleneck model with homogeneous preferences 
 
In this section, we first present a general formulation of the activity-based bottleneck model 
with homogeneous preferences and its properties. The preference homogeneity means that all 
commuters in the system have the same marginal activity utility functions and parameter 
values (i.e., only one user class). Two special cases of the model are then discussed: constant 
marginal activity utility case and linear marginal activity utility case. 
 
3.1. A general formulation 
 
We consider a morning commuting schedule that consists of two activities (i.e., being at home 
and being at work) and one trip (i.e., the journey from home to work), as shown in Fig. 3. 
Every morning, N commuters travel from home to a workplace connected by a single road 
that is subject to bottleneck queuing congestion. Commuters can gain utility from being at 
home and from being at work. We define a clock time St  as the morning start time and a 
clock time Et  as the morning end time. Both are arbitrarily chosen such that all travel takes 
place within the interval [ , ]S Et t . For example, St  is chosen early enough and Et  is chosen 
late enough. We denote dt  as the departure time of a commuter from home and at  as the 
arrival time of a commuter at workplace. The free-flow travel time from home to work is 
normalized to be zero, as in the traditional Vickrey's bottleneck model. A commuter departing 
at dt  encounters a queuing time of ( )dT t  at the bottleneck and reaches the workplace at 
time ( )a d dt t T t  . 
 
The departure time choices of commuters during the morning peak are based on the trade-off 
between the utilities of activities performed at home and at work and the journey time from 
home to work. Commuters choose their departure times from home to work in the morning 
interval [ , ]S Et t  to maximize their own scheduling utility. To represent commuters’ 
scheduling utility, we define the marginal utilities of being at home, at work, and in a vehicle 
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as follows. Let )(th  represent the marginal utility of being at home relative to the marginal 
utility of being in a vehicle at time t, and let )(tw  represent the marginal utility of being at 
work relative to the marginal utility of being in a vehicle at time t. Without loss of generality, 
the utility of being in a vehicle is normalized to zero. Thus, for given departure time dt  and 
arrival time at , the total utility derived from activities in the morning interval [ , ]S Et t  can be 
represented as 
( , ) ( ) ( )d E
S a
t t
d a t t
U t t h t dt w t dt   .  (10) 
The formulation of such scheduling utilities originates from Vickrey (1973) and has been 
applied by Tseng and Verhoef (2008), Engelson and Fosgerau (2011), Fosgerau and Engelson 
(2011), Jenelius et al. (2011), Börjesson et al. (2012), Fosgerau and de Palma (2012), 
Fosgerau and Lindsey (2013), and Hjorth et al. (2015). However, these previous related 
studies did not carry out an in-depth analysis of the properties of the scheduling utility 
function, which is presented as follows. 
 
The scheduling utility defined in Eq. (10) depends on the chosen times St  and Et . For the 
purposes of presentation, we normalize the scheduling utility function to eliminate the effects 
of St  and Et . In this paper, both )(th  and )(tw  are assumed to be positive to guarantee 
that the value of travel time saving is positive. To motivate making a trip, at some time point 
the value of )(tw  must exceed the value of )(th . We assume that )(th  monotonically 
decreases and that )(tw  monotonically increases and that a time **t  exists such that 
)()( twth   for **t t  and )()( twth   for **t t . These assumptions have been justified in 
previous empirical studies (see, e.g., Tseng and Verhoef, 2008; Börjesson et al., 2012), and 
have also been adopted in the studies of Engelson and Fosgerau (2011), Fosgerau and Lindsey 
(2013), and Hjorth et al. (2015). Under these assumptions, travelers prefer to be at home 
before **t  and at work after **t . Referring to Fig. 4, the potential maximum scheduling 
utility that one commuter can achieve in the morning interval [ , ]S Et t  is 
**
**
** **( , ) ( ) ( )E
S
t t
t t
U t t h t dt w t dt   .  (11) 
 
We now define the relative scheduling utility of commuters as the difference between 
( , )d aU t t  and 
** **( , )U t t , that is, 
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     ** **ˆ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )d a d aU t t U t t U t t   
**
**
( ) ( )a
d
t t
t t
h t dt w t dt    .  (12) 
Accordingly, the scheduling utility of commuters in the morning can be evaluated at **t  
rather than at St  and Et  in terms of Eq. (12). 
 
For the purpose of presentation, we define the scheduling opportunity cost (also referred to as 
travel cost in this paper) of the morning commute starting at dt  and ending at at  as 
**
**
( , ) ( ) ( )a
d
t t
d a t t
C t t h t dt w t dt   ,  (13) 
or equivalently 
**
**
( )
( ) ( ) ( )d d
d
t t T t
d t t
C t h t dt w t dt
   .  (14) 
Hence, maximizing the scheduling utility ( , )d aU t t  in Eq. (10) for the choice of departure 
time dt  in the morning is equivalent to minimizing the travel cost ( , )d aC t t  or ( )dC t  in Eq. 
(13) or (14). The scheduling model (or called activity-based bottleneck model in this paper) 
for the morning commute can thus mathematically be formulated as 
min  ( , )
d
d at
C t t  or min  ( )
d
dt
C t .  (15) 
 
Fig. 4 is used to graphically illustrate the implications of Eqs. (10)-(14). Note that there are 
three possible relationships among dt , at , and 
**t : (i) dt  is before 
**t  and at  is after 
**t  
(see Fig. 4a); (ii) both dt  and at  are before 
**t  (see Fig. 4b); and (iii) both dt  and at  are 
after **t  (see Fig. 4c). The scheduling utility of performing home or work activity over a 
period can be graphically identified as the area of the region below the marginal utility curve 
)(th  or )(tw  over that period, as indicated in Fig. 4.  
 
The scheduling utilities and costs for these three cases are, respectively, given as follows. The 
scheduling utility ( , )d aU t t  of commuters over the morning interval [ , ]S Et t  is the sum of 
( )d
S
t
t
h t dt  and ( )E
a
t
t
w t dt  in terms of Eq. (10). For case (i), the former is the sum of the areas 
of I and II, whereas the latter is the sum of the areas of VII and VIII. We thus have 
( , ) ( ) ( )d aU t t I II VII VIII    , which are the areas marked in red in Fig. 4a. Note that the 
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potential maximum scheduling utility ** **( , )U t t  is the sum of the areas of all of the 
partitions below the marginal utility curves )(th  and )(tw , i.e., 
** **( , )U t t I II III IV V VI VII VIII        . The scheduling opportunity cost ( , )d aC t t , 
which is the difference between ** **( , )U t t  and ( , )d aU t t , can thus be represented as 
** ** **( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,   for  d a d a d aC t t U t t U t t III IV V VI t t t        , (16) 
which are the areas marked in blue in Fig. 4a. 
 
Similarly, for case (ii), ( , ) ( ) ( )d aU t t I II V VI VII     , i.e., the areas marked in red in Fig. 
4b. We thus obtain the scheduling opportunity cost ( , )d aC t t  as below. 
** ** **( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,   for  d a d a d aC t t U t t U t t III IV t t t      , (17) 
which are the areas marked in blue in Fig. 4b. 
 
For case (iii), ( , ) ( ) ( )d aU t t I II IV VI VII     , i.e., the areas marked in red in Fig. 4c. 
One thus obtains the scheduling opportunity cost ( , )d aC t t  
** ** **( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,   for  d a d a d aC t t U t t U t t III V t t t      , (18) 
which are the areas marked in blue in Fig. 4c. 
 
In comparison with the previous related studies, the above graphical illustration provides a 
clearer explanation on the implication of the travel cost function ( , )d aC t t  or ( )dC t  in the 
activity-based bottleneck model (15). The following proposition further presents the 
properties of the activity-based bottleneck model (15), which are not investigated in the 
previous related studies. Its proof is provided in Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1. (i) If )(th  monotonically decreases, )(tw  monotonically increases, and both 
intersect at one point, then a queue must exist at the bottleneck. (ii) The queuing delay time 
curve is concave. 
 
Remark 2. Proposition 1 reveals the concavity of the queuing delay time curve. This means 
that the queue length at the bottleneck first increases from zero since the time qt  that the first 
commuter departs from home, and then decreases to zero at the time qt   that the last 
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commuter departs from home. Thereby, a queue always exists for any time ( , )q qt t t  . 
 
According to Eq. (2) and ( ) ( )T t D t s , one can obtain ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1dT t dD t r t
dt s dt s
   . From the 
first-order optimality condition of the activity-based bottleneck model (15), one obtains 
( ) ( ) 1
( ( ))
dT t h t
dt w t T t
   (cf. the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 1). We thus have 
 
Proposition 2. The equilibrium departure rate ( )r t  of the activity-based bottleneck model 
(15) is 
( )( )
( ( ))
h tr t s
w t T t
  .  (19) 
 
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium departure rate ( )r t  is governed by the ratio of the 
marginal home activity utility at departure time t  from home to the marginal work activity 
utility at arrival time ( )t T t  at the workplace. 
 
3.2. Constant marginal activity utility case 
 
In this subsection, we discuss the special case of constant marginal activity utilities. Suppose 
that the commuters’ marginal utility ( )h t  of being at home is a constant over the period 
concerned and that the marginal utility ( )w t  of being at work is piecewise constant (or a step 
function) with a discrete jump at time **t  (as shown in Fig. 5a), that is, 
 ( )h t   .  (20) 
**
**
,  if  ( ) ,
( )
,  if  ( ) .
t T t t
w t
t T t t
        
  (21) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (20) and (21) into Eq. (13) or (14) yields the travel cost function in 
traditional Vickrey’s bottleneck model (see Eq. (1)). This means that the traditional Vickrey’s 
bottleneck model can be formulated as an activity-based bottleneck model with constant 
marginal activity utilities and is thus a special case of the activity-based bottleneck model 
(15). 
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3.3. Linear marginal activity utility case 
 
We now consider the linear marginal activity utility case. As previously stated, the linear 
marginal activity utilities can be regarded as an approximation of any nonlinear marginal 
activity utility functions through the first-order Taylor expansion. This study thus provides an 
avenue for roughly evaluating the solutions with general scheduling preferences. 
 
Define ( )h t  and ( )w t  as the linear or affine functions of time t, as follows. 
( ) ,h t t      (22) 
( ) ,w t t      (23) 
where the parameters  ,  , and   are positive, and the parameter   is negative. As 
stated before, in order to motivate making a trip, )(tw  and )(th  must intersect at a time 
point of **t     , as depicted in Fig. 5b. Thus,     should be satisfied if 
** 0t  . 
 
Substituting Eqs. (22) and (23) and **t      into Eq. (14), one obtains the travel cost 
function ( )C t  as below 
**
**
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t t T t
t t
C t h t dt w t dt
    
       2** 2 2 ** ** 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2t t t t T t t T t t           , 
      
2
22 ( ) ( )
2 2 2
t t T t t T t
             .  (24) 
 
The first commuter who departs from home at qt  faces no queue due to his or her early 
departure from home. His or her travel cost is represented as 
       ** 2 ** 2 **1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2qtq q qtC t h t w t dt t t t t           
          
2
21
2 2q q
t t
          .  (25) 
 
Similarly, the last commuter who departs at qt   also faces no queue due to his or her late 
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departure from home. The associated travel cost is 
       ** 2 ** 2 **1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2qtq q qtC t w t h t dt t t t t             
          
2
21
2 2q q
t t 
           .  (26) 
 
From the equilibrium condition )()( qq tCtC  , we obtain 
 2
q qt t
     . (27) 
 
According to Proposition 1 and Remark 2, for the activity-based bottleneck model with linear 
marginal activity utilities, a queue always exists at the bottleneck for any time ( , )q qt t t  . 
The departure rate from the bottleneck for any time ( , )q qt t t   thus equals the capacity s of 
that bottleneck. Therefore, the length of the morning peak period at the bottleneck can be 
calculated by 
s
Ntt qq  .  (28) 
From Eqs. (27) and (28), we obtain 
,
2
.
2
q
q
Nt
s
Nt
s
           
 (29) 
Substituting Eq. (29) into Eqs. (25) and (26) yields the following equilibrium travel cost 
 22( ) ( ) ( ) 8q q
NC t C t C t
s
     .  (30) 
 
From Eqs. (24) and (30), one can derive the equilibrium queuing delay time ( )T t  and the 
time with maximum queuing delay for the activity-based bottleneck model with linear 
marginal activity utilities as follows.  
 
Proposition 3. (i) The equilibrium queuing delay time ( )T t  at the bottleneck is a quadratic 
(or parabolic) curve with regard to t, expressed as 
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          
2 2
2 2
2( ) ( ) 0,   [ , ]2 2 2 8 q q
NT t t T t t t t t t
s 
                 ,  (31) 
or equivalently, 
        
2 2
2 2
2
1( ) 2 ,   [ , ]
2 2 8 q q
NT t t t t t t t t
s 
                             
. (32) 
 
(ii) The time with maximum queuing delay occurs at 
  
 
2
2
22
21ˆ
4
Nt
s
                 .  (33) 
 
Remark 3. (i) ( )T t  in Eq. (32) is continuous, differentiable, and nonlinear with regard to 
time t under the assumption of linear marginal activity utility functions. This is an important 
difference from the traditional Vickrey’s bottleneck model with constant marginal utilities, in 
which the queuing delay time curve is a piecewise linear function of time (see Eq. (7) and Fig. 
1c) and is thus non-differentiable due to the assumption of constant marginal activity utility 
functions (see Eqs. (20) and (21)). 
(ii) It can easily be shown that the second-order derivative of ( )T t  with regard to t is 
negative, i.e., 
2
2
( ) 0d T t
dt
 . Consequently, ( )T t  is a concave function of time t. This result is 
consistent with part (ii) of Proposition 1. 
(iii) The time, tˆ , with the maximum queuing delay can directly be derived by setting 
ˆ( ) 0dT t
dt
 . It is a critical time for identifying the relationship between the equilibrium 
departure rate ( )r t  and the bottleneck capacity s, i.e., 
ˆ,  ,
ˆ( ) ,  ,
ˆ,  ,
s t t
r t s t t
s t t
   
 (34) 
where the equilibrium departure rate ( )r t  can be given by Eq. (19). 
 
3.4. An illustrative example 
 
In this section, a numerical example is employed to illustrate the properties of the proposed 
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activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities. The marginal utility 
functions for home and work activities are assumed to follow Eqs. (22) and (23). The 
empirical results for parameters   and   of Tseng and Verhoef (2008) are adopted: 
8.86   ( 2$ / h ) and 25.42  ( 2$ / h ).   and   are assumed to $57 and $40 per hour, 
respectively. The total number of commuters N is assumed to be 8000, and the capacity s of 
the bottleneck is 4000 vehicles per hour. 
 
Fig. 6a shows the departure rate of commuters during the morning peak period. It can be seen 
that the departure rate over time comprises a continuous and monotonically decreasing curve, 
which is different from the departure rate curve of the traditional Vickrey's bottleneck model, 
which is piecewise constant (see Fig. 1a). Fig. 6b displays the results of the cumulative 
departures from home and the cumulative arrivals at the workplace during the morning 
commute. It shows that the cumulative departure curve is nonlinear, continuous and 
differentiable, unlike the Vickrey’s bottleneck model, in which the cumulative departure curve 
is piecewise linear and non-differentiable (see Fig. 1b).  
 
Fig. 6c shows that the queuing delay time at the bottleneck during the morning commute first 
increases and then decreases, and the maximum queuing delay of 0.319 hour occurs at 
ˆ 0.26t  , in terms of Eq. (33). This is because when ˆ 0.26t t  , the departure rate ( )r t  is 
greater than the bottleneck capacity of s = 4000 vehicles per hour. When ˆ 0.26t t  , the 
departure rate is less than the bottleneck capacity s, as shown in Fig. 6a. Fig. 6c also shows 
that the queuing delay curve in the activity-based bottleneck model with the linear marginal 
activity utilities is also nonlinear, continuous and differentiable. However, it is piecewise 
linear and non-differentiable for the traditional Vickrey's bottleneck model (see Fig. 1c). This 
further illustrates the results in Proposition 3 and Remark 3. 
 
4. Step tolling with homogeneous preferences 
 
In this section, we investigate the step tolling problem in the activity-based bottleneck model 
with linear marginal activity utilities under homogeneous preferences. To examine the 
efficiency of a step toll scheme in removing the queue at the bottleneck, the social optimum 
(i.e., first-best) tolling scheme is used as the benchmark. 
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4.1. Social optimum tolling scheme 
 
The social optimum refers to a situation in which the total scheduling cost of commuters is 
minimized. The following proposition reveals the relationship between the social optimum 
and user equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4. For the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities, 
when the queuing delay at the bottleneck is just replaced by a time-varying toll, the no-toll 
user equilibrium is automatically driven to the social optimum. 
 
Proof. We need to prove that there is a time-varying toll such that marginal social cost equals 
marginal private cost. Suppose that a time-varying toll ( )t  is imposed and the resultant 
queuing delay time at the bottleneck at any time t is zero, i.e., ( ) 0T t  . From Eq. (24), when 
( ) 0T t  , the travel cost function ( )C t  with an imposed toll ( )t  becomes 
    
**
**
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t t
C t h t dt w t dt t      
              
2
21 ( ),   [ , ]
2 2 q q
t t t t t t 
             ,  (35) 
where ( )t  denotes the congestion toll at the bottleneck at time t during the morning peak. 
 
Note that the first (or last) commuter who departs from home faces no queue, and thus, the 
associated congestion toll for the first (or last) commuter is zero, i.e., ( ) ( ) 0q qt t     . The 
resultant travel cost can, therefore, be given by  22( ) ( ) 8q q
NC t C t
s
      according to Eq. 
(30). 
 
At the equilibrium, ( ) ( ) ( )q qC t C t C t  . From Eq. (35), the time-varying toll ( )t  can be 
given by 
        
2 2
2
2
1( ) ,   [ , ]
2 2 8 q q
Nt t t t t t
s 
                .  (36) 
 
Eq. (36) implies that there is a time-varying congestion toll ( )t , which ensures that the 
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travel costs of all commuters are equal to ( )qC t  or ( )qC t  . As a result, the total social cost 
(SC) for all commuters is 
            
2
21SC ( ) ( )
2 2
q q
q q
t t
t t
C t t sdt t t sdt 
                   
        3224
N
s
   . (37) 
It should be pointed out that the congestion toll is not included in the total social cost. This is 
because the payment of toll implies only a transfer of money from road users to the authority 
within the system and not a deadweight loss.  
 
Consequently, the marginal social cost SCd dN  can be calculated as 
        22SC ( ) ( )8 q q
d N C t C t
dN s 
      . (38) 
Eq. (38) shows that the marginal social cost exactly equals the marginal private cost ( )qC t  
or ( )qC t  , implying that the system optimum state is reached. This completes the proof of this 
proposition. 
 
From Proposition 4, the congestion toll under the social optimum tolling scheme directly 
substitutes for the queuing delay at the bottleneck, and thus the queuing delay is zero. 
Apparently, in both the social optimum and the no-toll equilibrium, the capacity of the 
bottleneck is fully utilized during the morning peak, i.e., the departure rate equals the capacity 
of the bottleneck. Moreover, the travel costs are the same for the first and last commuters for 
both the social optimum and the no-toll equilibrium. Thus, for a given number of commuters, 
the start and end times of the morning peak period and the cumulative arrivals under the 
social optimum are the same as those under the no-toll equilibrium. 
 
Remark 4. Since the time-varying toll ( )t  in Eq. (36) directly replaces the queuing delay at 
the bottleneck, ( )t  also represents the queuing delay cost at the bottleneck at time t. ( )T t  
in Eq. (32) represents the queuing delay time at the bottleneck at time t. Thereby, ( )t  is 
measured in monetary unit, whereas ( )T t  is measured in time unit. From Eqs. (32) and (36), 
one can easily derive the following relationship: 
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( ) ( )( ) ,   [ , ]
( ) 2 q q
t T tw t t t t
T t 
    . (39) 
Eq. (39) shows that a marginal decrease in the queuing delay time requires an increase in the 
toll by ( )( )
2
T tw t  . The value of the queuing delay time is thus larger than the marginal 
work utility ( )w t . 
 
For the bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities, the social optimum 
time-varying congestion toll ( )t  in Eq. (36) represents a parabolic curve with symmetric 
axis **t  and maximum toll max , as follows. 
 
**
2
max 2
,
.
8
t
N
s
        
  (40) 
 
Note that the area of the diagram below the time-varying congestion toll curve ( )t  equals 
the bottleneck queuing delay cost under the no-toll equilibrium, represented as NT . Thereby, 
the total queuing delay cost NT , which equals the total toll revenue, can be given by 
NT ( )q
q
t
t
t sdt           
2 2
22
2
2
1
2 2 8
N
s
N
s
Nt t sdt
s

                   
 3212
N
s
   , (41) 
where the superscript “NT” represents the no-toll case. 
 
The social-optimum congestion toll ( )t changes continuously over time, and its 
implementation thus becomes prohibitive due to drivers’ cognitive barrier. Therefore, a step 
toll scheme has been suggested as a substitute or approximation to the social-optimum 
time-varying toll scheme. In the step toll scheme, the study period is discretized into small 
intervals, and the toll takes different values over these discrete time intervals but remains 
constant within each interval. Although the step tolling system cannot remove queues 
completely, it can easily be implemented in practice, such as the London's single-step tolling 
system. It may, thus, be more acceptable than the social-optimum time-varying toll scheme.  
 
 21
4.2. Step tolling schemes 
 
The optimal step toll scheme aims to determine the optimal tolling time points for each step 
and the corresponding toll level. In this subsection, we focus on the optimal step toll scheme 
with linear marginal activity utilities. A step toll structure is called an optimal scheme if and 
only if it removes the largest proportion of the total bottleneck queuing delay. Note that 
maximizing queuing removal under the toll scheme is equivalent to maximizing the toll 
revenue, which requires that the optimal step tolls are inscribed in the concave social 
optimum time-varying toll curve (see Eq. (36)). If the step toll is beyond the social optimum 
time-varying toll during a time period, then it will impose a higher commuting cost to those 
who depart during that time period than the no-toll equilibrium cost due to an excessively 
high toll. As a result, the equilibrium will be inefficient. Consequently, the maximum toll 
revenue can be achieved if and only if the optimal step tolls are inscribed in the social 
optimum time-varying toll curve. In the following, single-step and multistep toll schemes are 
in turn presented. 
 
4.2.1. Single-step toll 
 
The single-step toll scheme is defined by its toll level 1  and the times at which it is turned 
on ( 1t
 ) and off ( 1t
 ), where the subscript “1” represents the single-step toll scheme. Obviously, 
1 1 1( ) ( )t t
       holds for the single-step toll scheme. Because the social optimum 
time-varying congestion toll curve ( )t  is symmetric with regard to **t t  (see Eq. (40) 
and Fig. 7), the tolling start time 1t
  and end time 1t
  are also symmetric with regard to 
**t t , implying ** **1 1t t t t     or **1 12t t t   . The goal of the single-step toll scheme is 
to maximize queuing removal by designing the combination of 1t
  and 1t
 , subject to 
1 1 1( ) ( )t t
       and **1 12t t t   , as illustrated in Fig. 7. Note that the area of the diagram 
below the time-varying congestion toll curve ( )t  equals the queuing delay cost at the 
bottleneck. Accordingly, maximizing queuing removal under the toll scheme is equivalent to 
maximizing the toll revenue, which is the area of the rectangle inscribed in the optimal 
time-varying toll curve, expressed as 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1max   ( , , )=t t t t s       ,  (42) 
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s.t. 1 1 1
**
1 1
( ) ( ),
2 .
t t
t t t
 
 
      
  (43) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (36) and (43) into Eq. (42) yields 
        
2 2
2
1 1 1 1 1 2
1max   ( )=2 ( )
2 2 8
Nt s t t t
s
                            
.  (44) 
From the first-order optimality condition of maximization problem (44), one obtains 
1
3
6
Nt
s
     , and 1
3
6
Nt
s
     .  (45) 
Substituting Eq. (45) into 1 1 1( ) ( )t t
      , we have 
 21 max2 212 3
N
s
      .  (46) 
where  2max 28
N
s
     , as given in Eq. (40). 
 
The resultant maximum queuing removal is 
 3 NT1,max 23 336 3
N
s
      ,  (47) 
where the queuing delay cost NT  under the no-toll equilibrium is given by Eq. (41). 
 
The following proposition summarizes the results under the single-step toll scheme. 
 
Proposition 5. For the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities, 
the optimal single-step toll is 2 ( 0.667)
3
  of the maximum optimal time-varying toll and can 
eliminate 3 ( 0.577)
3
  of the total queuing delay that exists under the no-toll equilibrium. 
 
Remark 5. According to Lemma 1 and Proposition 5, the optimal single-step tolls 1  are, 
respectively, 1
2
 and 2
3
 of the corresponding maximum optimal time-varying toll max  for 
the activity-based bottleneck models with constant marginal utilities (i.e., Laih model) and 
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with linear marginal utilities (proposed in this paper). They can eliminate 1
2
 and 3
3
 of the 
associated total queuing delay that exists under the no-toll equilibrium. This means that 
compared to the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities, the 
activity-based bottleneck model with constant marginal activity utilities (i.e., Laih model) 
underestimates the optimal single-step toll solution in terms of ratio 1
max

  and the role of the 
single-step toll in removing the bottleneck queue in terms of the queuing removal rate QRR, 
with 1,maxNTQRR
  , i.e., the proportion of the removed bottleneck queuing delay to the total 
queuing delay under the no-toll equilibrium. 
 
4.2.2. Multistep toll 
 
The goal of the multistep (e.g., m-step) toll scheme is to determine the optimal tolling time 
points it
  and it
  ( 1, 2,..., )i m  and the corresponding toll levels i  and i , where 
( )i it
    and ( )i it    for any 1,2,...,i m , as shown in Fig. 8. In the following, we first 
present an important finding, i.e., the property of the optimal multistep toll scheme. 
 
Proposition 6. The optimal multistep toll scheme with linear marginal activity utilities must 
follow a symmetric (or shoulder) toll structure with **t t  as the symmetric axis, i.e., 
** **
i it t t t
     and i i   , 1, 2,...,i m . 
 
The proof of Proposition 6 is provided in Appendix B. This proposition shows that the 
optimal tolling time points it
  and it
  of the ith step ( 1,2,..., )i m  are symmetric with 
regard to **t t  and that the associated toll levels i  and i  at it  and it  are equal. In 
what follows, we denote the ith step toll level as i , where ( ) ( )i i i it t         for any 
step 1,2,...,i m . 
 
We now look at the multistep toll problem, beginning with the two-step toll, as shown in Fig. 
9. Similar to the single-step toll scheme, the two-step toll scheme aims to determine the toll 
levels 1  and 2  and the charging time points 1t , 1t , 2t , and 2t  to maximize the 
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queuing removal (or the total toll revenue), which is the sum of the areas of the rectangles 
inscribed in the optimal time-varying toll curve, i.e., 
     2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1max   ( , , , , , )=t t t t s t t s t t s t t                  ,  (48) 
   s.t.  
1 1 1
2 2 2
**
1 1
**
2 2
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
=2 ,
=2 .
t t
t t
t t t
t t t
 
 
 
 
          
  (49) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (36) and (49) into Eq. (48) yields the following unconstrained optimization 
problem. 
         **2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1max   ( , ) 2 2t t s t t s t t            
              
2 2
2
1 1 1 2
12 ( )
2 2 8
Ns t t t
s
                          
 
               
2 2
2
2 1 2 2 2
12 ( )
2 2 8
Ns t t t t
s
                     
.  (50) 
From the first-order optimality conditions of the maximization problem (50), we obtain 
1
2
1 ,
2 9 2 3
3 ,
2 9 2 3
Nt
s
Nt
s


               
  
1
2
1 ,
2 9 2 3
3 ,
2 9 2 3
Nt
s
Nt
s


               
  and 
1 max
2 max
8 2 3 ,
9 2 3
6 2 3 .
9 2 3
        
 (51) 
The resultant maximum queuing removal is 
     3 NT2,max 23 3-2 9 2 3 3 3-2 9 2 31231 12 3 31 12 3Ns
        .  (52) 
 
Proposition 7. For the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities, 
the optimal two-step tolls 1  and 2 , respectively, are 8 2 3 ( 0.819)9 2 3
   and 
6 2 3 ( 0.458)
9 2 3
   of the maximum optimal time-varying toll and can eliminate 
 3 3-2 9 2 3
( 0.736)
31 12 3
   of the total queuing delay that exists under the no-toll 
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equilibrium. 
 
Remark 6. For the convenience of the readers, we have summarized in Table 1 the optimal 
solutions for the single-step and two-step toll schemes for the activity-based bottleneck model 
with linear marginal activity utilities. It shows that for a given number of steps, the 
activity-based bottleneck model with constant marginal utilities (i.e., traditional bottleneck 
model) underestimates the optimal step toll solution in terms of the proportion of the optimal 
step toll solution to the maximum optimal time-varying toll and the role of the step toll 
scheme in terms of the queuing removal rate, compared to the activity-based bottleneck model 
with linear marginal utilities. This means that for a given number of steps, the efficacy of a 
step toll is higher in the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal utilities than in 
that with constant marginal utilities in terms of the queuing removal rate. 
 
Similar to the two-step tolling problem, one can design an m-step toll scheme (see Fig. 8), in 
which the toll levels i  ( 1, 2,..., )i m  and the charging time points it  and it  
( 1, 2,..., )i m  are determined to maximize the queuing removal subject to ( ) ( )i i it t       
and **=2i it t t
  , 1, 2,...,i m . The m-step tolling model can be formulated as the following 
maximization problem. 
     1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
max   ( , ,..., , , ,..., , , ,..., )=
m m
m m m m i i i i i i
i i
t t t t t t s t t s t t s t t            
 
             , (53) 
s.t.  
**
( ) ( ),  1, 2,..., ,
=2 ,  1, 2,..., .
i i i
i i
t t i m
t t t i m
 
 
       
  (54) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (36) and (54) into (53) yields the following unconstrained maximization 
problem. 
       **1 2 1 1 1
2
max   ( , ,..., ) 2 2
m
m m i i i
i
t t t s t t s t t     

       .  (55) 
The first-order optimality condition of the maximization problem (55) is 
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     
       
     
2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
222
1 12
2
3 3 0,
2
3 2 2 0,  2,3,..., 1,
2
3 2 2 0.
4
i i i i i i i
m m m m m
t t t t
t t t t t t t i m
Nt t t t t
s
   
      
   
    
 
                                           
 (56) 
Solving the system of equations (56), one can obtain the optimal solutions of the decision 
variables i , it , and it  ( 1, 2,..., )i m  and thus the corresponding maximum queuing 
removal ,maxm  and the queuing removal rate ,maxNTm

 . 
 
4.3. An example of three-step tolls 
 
Suppose that a three-step toll scheme is applied to the bottleneck system, and the marginal 
utility functions for home and work activities are linear, as defined in Eqs. (22) and (23). The 
input data for all model parameters are the same as the example in Section 3.4. Substituting 
the parameter values into Eq. (56), we obtain the solutions of the three-step toll scheme as 
follows: 3 $5.91  , 2 $11.06  , 1 $15.12  , 3 0.31t   , 2 0.10t   , 1 0.15,t   
1 0.85t
  , 2 1.10t  , and 3 1.31t  , as shown in Fig. 10. The total queuing delay cost NT  
that exists under the no-toll equilibrium is $91413. The maximum queuing delay cost removal 
3,max  is $73953. This means that the queuing removal rate 3,maxNT

  equals 0.809. Compared 
to the queuing removal rates of the single-step and two-step toll schemes (i.e., 0.577 and 
0.736), the queuing removal rate of the three-step toll scheme further increases. This is 
consistent with our intuition, namely as the number of steps increases, the discretized step 
tolling schemes are gradually close to the continuous time-varying tolling scheme. However, 
it should be mentioned that too many steps may add toll collection cost and confuse travelers 
due to their bounded rationality such that they may not be able to respond effectively to the 
price signals. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the incremental benefits of reducing 
travel costs by adding toll steps and the incremental toll collection and driver compliance 
costs that would be incurred. The optimal number of steps may thus exist. The optimization 
problem of the number of steps makes an interesting and important research topic, but is 
outside the scope of this paper and thus left for future study. 
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5. Incorporating preference heterogeneity 
 
In the previous sections, we have addressed the step tolling problem in the bottleneck model 
with homogeneous preferences. In this section, we extend it to the case of heterogeneous 
preferences. Commuters are grouped according to their heterogeneous preferences, i.e., the 
marginal utility functions for home/work activities. For simplification purpose, in the paper 
we focus on two groups, 1 and 2. Their linear marginal utility functions for home and work 
activities are, respectively, specified as 
( ) ,
  1, 2
( ) ,
g g g
g g g
h t t
g
w t t
        
,  (57) 
where g denotes a group of commuters. For any group g, the parameters g , g , and g  
are positive, and the parameter g  is negative. 
 
Let gN  be the number of commuters in group g and N be the total number of commuters in 
the system, with 
1 2N N N  .  (58) 
 
5.1. No-toll equilibrium 
 
We first analyze the no-toll equilibrium with heterogeneous commuters. By the equilibrium's 
definition, at the equilibrium, no commuter can reduce his/her trip cost by changing choice of 
departure time. This means that all members in a group incur the same trip cost for their 
chosen departure times, and equal or higher costs at any other times. 
 
According to the isocost queuing delay curve under homogeneous preferences (see Fig. 6c), 
one can depict the isocost queuing delay curves with considering commuters' heterogeneous 
preferences. For illustration purpose, Fig. 11 displays the case of two groups, in which group 
2 has a higher marginal work utility than group 1 (i.e., 1 2w w ), but both groups have the 
same marginal home activity utility. Thereby, the isocost queuing delay curve for group 2 is 
on the left of that for group 1 in terms of the axis ** g gg
g g
t
     (cf. Eq. (40)). It can be seen 
that the isocost queuing delay curves for the two groups may not intersect (Fig. 11a) or 
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intersect (Fig. 11b). Apparently, the case without overlap can be seen as a simple combination 
of the (separate) isocost curves of different groups. Thus, all properties under the 
homogeneous case, as presented in previous sections, still hold. In the following, we consider 
only the case that the isocost queuing delay curves for different groups intersect. 
 
Note that at any given time, all commuters face the same queue. This implies that the isocost 
queuing delay curve with heterogeneous groups is the upper envelope of all groups’ isocost 
queuing delay curves, as shown in bold in Fig. 11b. Otherwise, any commuter in other group 
could reduce its travel cost by changing its departure time. The equilibrium frontier means 
that each departure slot is allocated to that group which is willing to pay the most for it, in 
terms of queuing delay. Note that as the marginal work utility (i.e., g  or g ) of a specific 
group increases, the axis ** g gg
g g
t
     of that group moves towards the left, and thus the 
isocost queuing delay curve for that group also moves towards the left. Similarly, given the 
marginal work utility (i.e., g  and g ), one can easily find that as the marginal home 
activity utility (i.e., g  or g ) of a specific group increases, the isocost queuing delay curve 
for that group moves towards the right. We thus have the following property for the departure 
time choice equilibrium of heterogeneous groups. 
 
Proposition 8. At the equilibrium, groups sequentially depart in order of decreasing marginal 
work activity utility or increasing marginal home activity utility. 
 
Proposition 8 implies that if group 2 has a higher marginal work (home) activity utility than 
group 1, then group 2 (group 1) is the first to depart, and then group 1 (group 2). There exists 
a boundary time between group 1’s and group 2’s departures, i.e. the intersection between the 
isocost queuing delay curves of the two groups, which is represented as 12t . In Fig. 11, group 
2 departs at interval 12[ , ]qt t , while group 1 departs at interval 12[ , ]qt t  , that is, 
12 2
12 1
,
.
q
q
t t N s
t t N s
   
  (59) 
 
At the equilibrium, the commuters from an identical group should have the same travel cost 
regardless of their departure times. We thus have 
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1 12 1( ) ( )qC t C t  , where 
      
      
2
2 1 121 1
1 12 12 1 1 12 1 12 12 12
1 1
2
1 12
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
2 2 2
1( ) .
2 2q q q
C t t t T t t T t
C t t t  
                         
  (60) 
2 12 2( ) ( )qC t C t , where 
      
      
2
2 2 222 2
2 12 12 2 2 12 2 12 12 12
2 2
2
2 22
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
2 2 2
1( ) .
2 2q q q
C t t t T t t T t
C t t t
                           
  (61) 
 
It should be mentioned that the expressions for 1 12( )C t , 2 12( )C t , 1( )qC t  , and 2 ( )qC t  in Eqs. 
(60) and (61) are directly from Eqs. (24)-(26). Solving the system of Eqs. (59)-(61), one can 
obtain the no-toll equilibrium solutions of qt , qt  , 12t , and 12( )T t . 
 
5.2. Step tolling with heterogeneous groups 
 
In this section, we examine the effects of the preference heterogeneity of commuters on the 
step tolling. Without loss of generality, in what follows we consider the heterogeneity in the 
marginal work utility only. That is, the parameters g  and g  in Eq. (57) are different 
across commuter groups, but the parameters g  and g  are the same for different groups. 
Hence, the subscripts for   and   can be removed, i.e., 1 2      and 1 2     . For 
the heterogeneity in the marginal home activity utility, one can easily derive its results in the 
same way. In order to save space, they are not shown here. In the following, we first present 
the social optimum toll and then determine the optimal step toll for the heterogeneity in the 
marginal work utility w . To do so, it is assumed that group 2 has a higher marginal work 
utility than group 1 (i.e., 1 2w w ). 
 
5.2.1. Social optimum tolling scheme 
 
Similar to the homogeneous case, the social optimum with heterogeneous groups involves no 
queuing because the queuing delay at the bottleneck is directly displaced by the toll. Under 
the assumption of 1 2w w , group 2 departs earlier than group 1 in terms of Proposition 8. 
Specifically, group 2 departs at 12[ , ]qt t , and group 1 departs at 12[ , ]qt t  , as shown in Fig. 11b. 
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The equilibrium with time-varying toll requires that the travel cost of all commuters in group 
1 equals the last commuter’s travel cost, i.e., 
**
1
**
1
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
q t t
C t h t dt w t dt t       
           
2
12
1 1 1 12
1
1 ( ),   [ , ]
2 2 q
t t t t t t 
            ,  (62) 
where 1( )t  is the congestion toll at the bottleneck at time 12[ , ]qt t t  . 
 
Substituting 1( )qC t   in Eq. (60) into Eq. (62) yields the optimal isocost time-varying toll for 
group 1 between 12t  and qt   as follows. 
     2 21 1 1 121( ) ,   [ , ]2 q q qt t t t t t t t             .  (63) 
 
Similarly, for group 2, the travel cost of all commuters equals the first commuter’s travel cost, 
i.e., 
**
2
**
2
2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
q t t
C t h t dt w t dt t      
           
2
22
2 2 2 12
2
1 ( ),   [ , ]
2 2 q
t t t t t t
            ,  (64) 
where 2 ( )t  is the congestion toll at the bottleneck at time 12[ , ]qt t t . 
 
Substituting 2 ( )qC t  in Eq. (61) into Eq. (64), one obtains the optimal isocost time-varying 
toll for group 2 between qt  and 12t  as below. 
     2 22 2 2 121( ) ,   [ , ]2 q q qt t t t t t t t          .  (65) 
 
The social optimum time-varying toll curves for groups 1 and 2, which are defined in Eqs. (63) 
and (65), are depicted in bold in Fig. 12. It shows that the social optimum with heterogeneous 
groups can be achieved with a piecewise quadratic time-varying tolling scheme that exactly 
replaces the bottleneck queuing delay costs. 
 
5.2.2. Step tolling scheme 
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The continuously changing charges, as expressed in Eqs. (63) and (65), are difficult to be 
implemented in real-world applications. Thus, a second-best step tolling scheme is usually 
adopted in practice, which is presented as follows. For ease of presentation, again we consider 
two groups of commuters, with 1 2w w . In order to derive a closed-form solution, we limit 
our attentions to a single-step tolling scheme for each group in this paper. The single-step toll 
structure to be determined for a two-group system resembles a two-step toll with 
homogeneous preferences, one step for each group. Similar to the homogeneous case, the step 
tolling scheme with heterogeneous groups aims to determine the toll window [ , ]g gt t
   (i.e., 
the period during which the toll applies) and the toll level g  for each group g (g = 1, 2) so 
as to maximize the queuing removal (or the total toll revenue). Apparently, both ends of the 
toll window [ , ]g gt t
   for group g may be inscribed in its time-varying toll curve or one end of 
the window is on the time-varying toll curve, whereas the other end is on the boundary 12t t . 
This leads to a total of four possible scenarios, as shown in Fig. 12. The step tolling models 
for the four scenarios are presented as follows, respectively. 
 
(1) Scenario I: when 2 12 1t t t
   , both ends of the step toll window for each group are 
inscribed in the optimal time-varying toll curve, as shown in Fig. 12a. The step tolling scheme 
is to determine g , gt  and gt  ( 1, 2)g   to maximize the total queuing removal subject to 
( ) ( )g g gt t
       and **=2g g gt t t  , 1, 2g  , expressed as 
   1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1max   ( , , , , , )=I t t t t t t s t t s               ,  (66) 
s.t. 
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
**
1 1 1
**
2 2 2
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
2 ,
2 ,
t t
t t
t t t
t t t
 
 
 
 
            
  (67) 
where the subscript in   represents the number of the model scenario. 
 
From the first-order optimality condition of model (66)-(67), one can easily derive the optimal 
solutions of g , gt  and gt  as follows. 
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q
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By Eq. (68), the total eliminated queuing delay cost, I , for Scenario I can be given by 
   2 2 2 1 1 1I t t s t t s                3 3** **2 2 1 12 39 q qs t t t t         .  (69) 
 
In addition, according to 2t
  and 1t
  in Eq. (68) and Eq. (59), the condition, 2 12 1t t t
   , 
leading to Scenario I can be further written as 
** **2 1
2 12 1
3 1 3 1
2 2
N Nt t t
s s
     , or 2 2 1 112
2 1
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           .  (70) 
 
(2) Scenario II: when 12 1 2min( , )t t t
   or equivalently 1 1 2 2
12
1 2
3 1 3 1min ,
2 2
N Nt
s s
               
, 
one end (i.e., 2t
 ) of the step toll window 2 2[ , ]t t
   for the high-income group (i.e., group 2) 
links the optimal time-varying toll curve and the other end links the boundary 12t t . 
However, both ends of the step toll window 1 1[ , ]t t
   for the low-income group (i.e., group 1) 
are inscribed in the optimal time-varying toll curve, as indicated in Fig. 12b. The model for 
optimizing 1 , 2 , 1t , 1t , and 2t  is as below. 
   1 1 1 2 2 12 2 2 1 1 1max   ( , , , , )=II t t t t t s t t s             ,  (71) 
s.t. 
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  (72) 
 
The resultant optimal solutions for 1 , 2 , 1t , 1t , and 2t  are 
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The total eliminated queuing delay cost, II , for Scenario II is thus given by 
         3** **1 1 2 12 2 2 2 22 3 19 2II q q qs t t s t t t t t t t                    .  (74) 
 
(3) Scenario III: when 12 1 2max( , )t t t
   or equivalently 1 1 2 2
12
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2 2
N Nt
s s
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, 
both ends of the step toll window 2 2[ , ]t t
   for group 2 are inscribed in the optimal 
time-varying toll curve. However, one end (i.e., 1t
 ) of the step toll window 1 1[ , ]t t
   for 
group 1 is on the time-varying toll curve and the other end (i.e., 1t
 ) is on the boundary 
12t t , as shown in Fig. 12c. The model for determining 1 , 2 , 1t , 2t , and 2t  is as 
below. 
   1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 12 1max   ( , , , , )=III t t t t t s t t s             ,  (75) 
s.t. 
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The optimal solutions of model (75)-(76) are given as follows. 
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  (77) 
The resultant total eliminated queuing delay cost, III , for Scenario III is 
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(4) Scenario IV: when 1 12 2t t t
    or equivalently 1 1 2 212
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s s
           , 
one end of the step toll window for each group is on the optimal time-varying toll curve and 
the other end is on the boundary 12t t , as shown in Fig. 12d. The queuing removal 
maximization problem for determining 1 , 2 , 1t  and 2t  is represented as 
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The resultant optimal solutions and total eliminated queuing delay cost for Scenario IV are 
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  (81) 
           ** **1 1 12 1 1 1 2 12 2 2 2 21 12 2IV q q q qs t t t t t t t s t t t t t t t                              . (82) 
 
For the convenience of the readers, the optimal solutions for the step toll levels g  and the 
charging time points gt
  and gt
  and the total eliminated queuing delay cost   under 
different scenarios are further summarized in Table 2. 
 
In order to assess the efficacy of a step toll scheme, one can calculate the queuing removal 
rate, which is the proportion of the removed queuing delay cost   to the total queuing delay 
cost under the no-toll equilibrium NT . The total queuing delay cost, NT , is equal to the 
total toll revenue of all commuters in groups 1 and 2, defined as 
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From Eqs. (69), (74), (78), (82) and (83), the queuing removal rate (QRR) for all scenarios 
can be calculated by NT

 . In contrast to the QRR of the single-step tolling scheme with the 
homogeneous preferences (its QRR value is 3 3, see Proposition 5), we obtain an important 
property about the efficacy of a step toll scheme. Its proof is provided in Appendix C. 
 
Proposition 9. When the preference heterogeneity is considered in the activity-based 
bottleneck model with linear marginal utilities, the queuing removal rate from the optimal 
single-step toll scheme would exceed 3
3
. This implies that the bottleneck model with 
homogeneous preferences would underestimate the efficacy of a step toll scheme in terms of 
the queuing removal rate, compared to the counterpart with heterogeneous preferences. 
 
Proposition 9 shows that the heterogeneity of commuters plays a significant role in evaluating 
the efficacy of congestion tolling scheme, and the assumption of commuters' homogeneity can 
lead to a biased estimation of the efficacy. Therefore, it is important to incorporate the 
commuters' preference heterogeneity in the congestion tolling models. 
 
5.3. Numerical illustration 
 
In this section, an example is used to illustrate the properties of the proposed step tolling 
models with heterogeneous groups. Herein, we only look at   heterogeneity because (i) both 
  and   have similar effects on marginal work utility in terms of Eq. (57); and (ii) a 
closed-form equilibrium solution exists for the   heterogeneity, but not for the   
heterogeneity. 
 
Under the   heterogeneity, the parameters  ,   and   are assumed to be identical 
across groups, i.e., 1 2   , 1 2    and 1 2   . According to Eqs. (59)-(61), one can 
derive the boundary time 12t  between group 1's and 2's departures and the associated queuing 
delay time 12( )T t  as 
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In the example, the number of commuters, 1N , in group 1 is assumed to be 4000, and the 
capacity s of the bottleneck is 4000 vehicles per hour. Again, the linear marginal utility 
functions for home and work activities are adopted, with parameters 1 2 57    ($ / h ), 
1 2 8.86     ( 2$ / h ) and 1 2 25.42    ( 2$ / h ). 1  is assumed to be $16 per hour. In 
the following, we will examine the effects of 2  and 2N  on the step tolling system. 
 
Fig. 13 shows the effects of 2  on the step tolling model adopted and the optimal step toll 
scheme for given 2 4000N  . It can be seen that as 2  increases from $25 to $50 per hour, 
the step tolling model adopted changes in the order of IV, II, and I, and for a given group the 
step toll in turn decreases. Specifically, the step toll decreases from $9.8 to $2.9 for group 2 
and from $8.8 to $2.8 for group 1, respectively. This is because the increase in 2  leads the 
isocost toll curves for groups 1 and 2 to be gradually separated, thus implying a decreased 
interaction between the members of groups. Particularly, as 2 25   ($/h), nearly half of the 
isocost toll curve for each group is overlapped. As a result, the queuing removal rate (57.97%) 
from the step tolls under the heterogeneous preferences is close to that under the 
homogeneous preferences. As 2  is doubled (i.e. 2 50   ($/h)), the isocost toll curves for 
the two groups are almost completely separated. Thus, the resultant queuing removal rate 
(57.74%) under the heterogeneous preferences is almost equal to that under the homogeneous 
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preferences. It should be pointed out that as 2  is very close to 16 ($/h) (i.e., the value of its 
lower bound 1 ), the isocost toll curves for the two groups become a continuous and 
symmetric parabolic curve and the single-step tolls for the two groups become the same, as 
shown in Fig. 7. This is because the right half of the isocost toll curve of group 2 exactly 
overlaps with the left half of the isocost toll curve of group 1. 
 
Fig. 14 shows the results with 2 6000N   and 2 = 40, 47, and 50 ($/h), respectively. It can 
be noted that the charging duration for group 2 becomes 1.5 hours and all of the queuing 
removal rates exceed 60%. Similar to the case of 2 4000N  , as 2  increases from $40 to 
$50 per hour, the associated step toll decreases for each group. However, the step tolling 
models adopted change in the order of IV, III, and I, which is different from the case of 
2 4000N  . Comparing Figs. 13 and 14, we can find that when 2 = 40 ($/h), the step tolling 
model adopted is Scenario II for 2 4000N   but Scenario IV for 2 6000N  . These results 
show that the travel demand and the marginal work utility have important impacts on the step 
tolling model adopted and the step toll scheme. 
 
Fig. 15 further shows the changes of the step tolling models adopted and the queuing removal 
rate with group 2's demand 2N  and the value of 2 . It can be observed that for 2 4000N  , 
when 2  is between 38.43 and 43.04 ($/h), the step tolling model adopted is Scenario II; 
when 2  is smaller than $38.43 per hour and larger than $43.04 per hour, the step tolling 
models adopted are Scenarios IV and I, respectively. For 2 6000N  , when 2  takes a value 
between 46.07 and 48.60 ($/h), Scenario III is adopted. Otherwise, Scenario IV is applied if 
2  is smaller than $46.07 per hour, and Scenario I is applied if 2  exceeds $48.60 per hour. 
It can also be observed that the queuing delay removal rate is always larger than 3 3, and 
for each of the two demand levels (i.e., 2 4000N   and 6000), as 2  increases, the queuing 
removal rate increases in the region of Scenario IV but decreases in the region of Scenario I. 
These observations indicate the preference heterogeneity and travel demand level have 
important impacts on the choice of step toll model. 
 
6. Conclusion and further studies 
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This paper revisits the step tolling issues for a road bottleneck using an activity-based 
modeling framework. The activity scheduling utilities of commuters at home and at work are 
assumed to be time-dependent during the day and that commuters make their departure time 
choices in the morning to maximize their own scheduling utility. The step tolling models with 
homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences are presented. The properties of the models and 
the optimal step toll scheme with linear time-varying scheduling utilities are analytically 
explored.  
 
Some important findings and new insights have been obtained. First, the solution curves of 
the activity-based bottleneck model with linear marginal utilities are nonlinear, continuous, 
and differentiable. These curves include the departure rate curve, cumulative departure curve, 
isocost queuing delay curve, and the social-optimum time-varying congestion toll curve. They 
are different from the activity-based bottleneck model with constant marginal utilities (i.e., 
traditional Vickrey's bottleneck model) in which these curves are piecewise constant or linear 
and non-differentiable. Second, the optimal step toll scheme with linear marginal activity 
utilities must follow a symmetric/shoulder toll structure. Third, for a given number of toll 
steps, the efficacy of the optimal step toll scheme is higher in the activity-based bottleneck 
model with linear marginal utilities than in the activity-based bottleneck model with constant 
marginal utilities in terms of bottleneck queuing removal rate. Fourth, at the user equilibrium, 
heterogeneous groups sequentially depart in order of decreasing marginal work utility or 
increasing marginal home activity utility, and ignoring the preference heterogeneity would 
underestimate the efficacy of a step toll scheme in terms of the queuing removal rate. These 
findings have significant implications for guiding the implementation of step toll schemes in 
practice. 
 
Although this paper provides some new insights into bottleneck tolling issues, some important 
extensions should be made in further studies. 
 
(1) This paper mainly focused on the step tolling issues in the activity-based bottleneck model 
with linear marginal activity utilities. Although the linear marginal activity utilities can be 
regarded as an approximation of any marginal activity utility functions through the first-order 
Taylor expansion, the properties of the model with the linear marginal utilities may not be 
applicable to the case with general scheduling preferences. Moreover, empirical evidence on 
the shape of marginal activity utility functions is still limited. When the marginal activity 
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utility functions are unknown, a trial-and-error iterative approach proposed by Li (1999, 2002) 
and Yang et al. (2004) may be applied, which is left for a future study. 
 
(2) This paper addressed the morning commuting problem, and the evening or day-long 
commuting problems are not considered. In reality, commuters’ morning and evening 
trip-timing decisions may interact (Zhang et al., 2005; Li et al., 2014). Thus, a day-long 
activity-based bottleneck model should be developed for the step tolling problem to reveal the 
differences between the morning and evening commutes in the efficiency gains and the 
welfare-distributional effects of step tolling. 
 
(3) The proposed activity-based bottleneck models in this paper were deterministic, implying 
that the effects of uncertainties in bottleneck capacity and travel demand were ignored. 
However, in reality the uncertainties in the bottleneck capacity and/or the travel demand may 
affect commuters’ activity schedules and departure time choices (Lindsey, 2009; Fosgerau and 
Lindsey, 2013; Xiao et al., 2015). It is thus necessary to consider the effects of these 
uncertainties in a future study for further improvement of the robustness of the proposed 
model. 
 
(4) This study focused on a single road bottleneck, and thus the congestion effects over space 
cannot be addressed. To do so, an activity-based network traffic assignment model should be 
developed (e.g., see Lam and Yin, 2001; Lam and Huang, 2002; Li et al., 2010; Fu and Lam, 
2014; Liu et al., 2015). In a further study, the proposed models in this paper can be extended 
to a network context such that the network congestion effects can be explicitly taken into 
account. 
 
(5) The modeling approach for the optimal step toll scheme in this paper was based on the 
Laih model (1994), and thus the braking behavior of drivers to avoid the toll payment cannot 
be incorporated. Recent studies of Lindsey et al. (2012) and Xiao et al. (2012) showed that 
drivers’ braking behavior can affect the design of the step tolling system. Therefore, there is a 
need to incorporate braking behavior in the activity-based step tolling model in a future study. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
(i) We need to prove that there exists some time ˆ ( , )q qt t t   where qt  and qt   are the 
departure times from home of the first and last commuters in the morning respectively, such 
that a queue exists at that time. A contradiction method is adopted here.  
 
Suppose that for any time ˆ ( , )q qt t t  , there is no queue. We then immediately obtain 
  **
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
t
t
C t h t w t dt  .  (A.1) 
Note that the first commuter departing from home at time qt  faces no queue. From Eq. (14), 
his or her travel cost is 
 ** ****( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q
q q
t t t
q t t t
C t h t dt w t dt h t w t dt      .  (A.2) 
Thus, we have 
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
q
t
q t
C t C t w t h t dt   .  (A.3) 
Under the assumption that )(th  monotonically decreases and )(tw  monotonically increases 
and that both satisfy )()( twth   for **t t  and )()( twth   for **t t , we have 
**
**
ˆ0,  if  ,
ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ0,  if  .
q
q
q
t t t
C t C t
t t t
     
  (A.4) 
This contradicts the equilibrium condition of ˆ( ) ( )qC t C t  for any tˆ . Therefore, there exists 
a time ˆ ( , )q qt t t   such that there is a queue at tˆ . 
 
(ii) The first-order optimality condition of minimization problem (15) implies 
( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ( )) 0dC t dT th t w t T t
dt dt
         .  (A.5) 
One thus obtains 
( ) ( ) 1
( ( ))
dT t h t
dt w t T t
  .  (A.6) 
Consequently, the second-order derivative of the queuing delay ( )T t  is 
22
2
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )1
( ( ))
d T t dh dT t dw
dt w t T t dt dt dt
           
.  (A.7) 
 45
 
Because )(th  monotonically decreases and )(tw  monotonically increases, ( ) 0dh
dt
   and 
( ) 0dw
dt
   hold. In addition, the marginal work activity utility )(tw  is positive. 
Consequently, 
2
2
( ) 0d T t
dt
  in terms of Eq. (A.7), implying that the isocost queuing delay 
curve ( )T t  is concave. This completes the proof. 
 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 6 
 
The mathematical induction method is adopted. First, we prove that Proposition 6 is true for 
the two-step toll scheme (i.e., 2m  ). For doing so, a contradiction approach is used. 
Suppose that the optimal two-step toll scheme with the linear marginal activity utilities is not 
a symmetric (or shoulder) structure with regard to **t , namely ** **2 2t t t t
     (or 
**
2 22t t t
   ) and 2 2( ) ( )t t    . For ease of presentation, we denote 2( )t  as 2  and 
2( )t
  as 2 , i.e., 2 2( )t    and 2 2( )t   . The two-step toll scheme aims to determine 
1 , 2 , 2 , 1t , 1t , 2t , and 2t  (cf. Fig. 9) to maximize the queuing removal (or the total 
toll revenue), which is the sum of the areas of the rectangles inscribed in the optimal 
time-varying toll curve, expressed as 
     2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1max   ( , , , , , , )=t t t t s t t s t t s t t                    ,  (B.1) 
 s.t.  
1 1 1
2 2
2 2
**
1 1
**
2 2
( ) ( ),
( ),
( ),
=2 ,
2 .
t t
t
t
t t t
t t t
 


 
 
            
  (B.2) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (36) and (B.2) into Eq. (B.1), we obtain 
           ** 2 ** 22 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 21 1max   ( , , )=2 ( ) 2 ( )2 2t t t s t t t t s t t t t t                                
 46
                   
22
2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 ( )
2 8 2
Ns t t t t s t t
s
                             
.  (B.3) 
From the first-order optimality condition of the maximization problem (B.3), we have 
   
    
     
 
** 2 2 2 **2
1 1 2 2 1 2 2
1
2
** 2 **2
2 1 2 2 2 12
2
2
22
2 1 2 2
2
1 1= 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) 2 4 0,
2 2
32 ( ) 2 2 0,
2 8 2
3= ( )
2 8
s t t t t t s t t t t
t
Ns t t t t t s t t t
t s
Ns t t t
t s
      

     

  

               
                         
           1 22 0.2s t t
 
                
  (B.4) 
 
Summing the second and third equations in Eq. (B.4) and substituting **t     , we obtain 
 ** **2 2 1 2 23 32 02 2t t t t t t t             .  (B.5) 
We thus have 
**
2 22t t t
   . (B.6) 
This contradicts the assumption of **2 22t t t
   . Therefore, the optimal two-step toll scheme 
with the linear marginal activity utilities follows a symmetric toll structure. 
 
We now prove that Proposition 6 is true for the ( 1)m -step toll scheme, assuming the truth 
of the statement for the m-step toll scheme. This means that the optimal m-step toll scheme 
with the linear marginal activity utilities is symmetric, i.e., ** **i it t t t
     (or **2i it t t   ) 
and i i    ( 1,2,..., )i m . Again, a contradiction approach is adopted. Suppose that the 
( 1)m  th-step toll does not follow a symmetric toll structure, i.e., **1 12m mt t t     and 
1 1m m    . The ( 1)m -step toll scheme aims to determine tolling time points it  and 
it
 ( 1,2,..., 1)i m   and toll levels i  and i ( 1,2,..., 1)i m   to maximize the queuing 
removal (or the total toll revenue), subject to i it t
   , i i    ( 1, 2,..., )i m , 
**
1 12m mt t t
 
    and 1 1m m    . The resultant maximization problem is as below 
       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1max   ( ,..., , , ,..., , )= 2 2 2m m m m i i i m m mt t t t s t t s t t s t t s t t                                  
   1 1 1 1m m m m m ms t t s t t          , (B.7) 
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s.t.  
**
1 1
1 1
**
1 1
( ) ( ),  1, 2,..., ,
=2 ,  1, 2,..., ,
( ),
( ),
2 .
i i i
i i
m m
m m
m m
t t i m
t t t i m
t
t
t t t
 
 

 

 
 
 
              
  (B.8) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (36) and (B.8) into (B.7), we obtain 
     ** 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11max   ( ,..., , ,..., , , )=2 ( )2m m m m mt t t t s t t t t                      
           2 ** 21 1 1 1
2
1 12 ( ) 2 ( )
2 2
m
i i i i m m m m
i
s t t t t s t t t t t          

                          
            
22
2
1 1 1 1 1 2
1 ( )
2 8 2m m m m m m
Ns t t t t s t t
s
     
    
                        
.  (B.9) 
 
The first-order optimality condition of maximization problem (B.9) can be derived as follows. 
 
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2 ** 2 ** ** 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 **
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 **
1 1 1 1 1 1
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3 1( ) 3 ( ) ( ) 0,
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                             
 (B.10) 
Summing the last two equations in Eq. (B.10), one obtains 
 ** **1 1 1 13 32 02 2m m m m mt t t t t t t                .  (B.11) 
Eq. (B.11) implies 
**
1 12m mt t t
 
   . (B.12) 
This contradicts the assumption of **1 12m mt t t
 
   . Consequently, the ( 1)m th-step toll 
follows a symmetric structure, and Proposition 6 is thus true for ( 1)m  -step toll scheme. 
This completes the proof of this proposition. 
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 9 
 
Note that 1 2      holds if ** 0t  . The change of 2  from 1  to   leads to four 
scenarios of the step toll model, i.e., Scenarios IV, III, II, and I, as formulated in Subsection 
5.2.2. When 2  is enough large (but smaller than  ), the isocost toll curves for groups 1 
and 2 are fully disjoint. For such an extreme case, model I is applicable and the associated 
total queuing delay NT  for all commuters in groups 1 and 2 can be given by 
**
2
**
1
2NT
2 12
( ) ( )q q
q q
t t t
t t t
t sdt t sdt


      ,  (C.1) 
where **22 qt t  is the symmetric point of qt  with regard to **2t , and **12 qt t   is the 
symmetric point of qt   with regard to 
**
1t . 
 
Substituting Eqs. (63) and (65) into (C.1) yields 
      3 3NT ** **2 2 1 123 q qs t t t t          .  (C.2) 
By Eq. (69), the removed queuing delay cost by the step tolling scheme is 
      3 3** **2 2 1 12 39 q qs t t t t         .  (C.3) 
 
The queuing removal rate QRR  is thus calculated as 
NT
3
3
QRR   .  (C.4) 
 
As 2  gradually decreases, the two isocost curves start to intersect, implying that the 
queuing removal rate QRR  for each group increases and its value is thus larger than 3
3
. 
As 2  continues to decrease such that 12t  arrives at 2t  (or 1t ), the queuing removal rate 
QRR  for group 2 (or group 1) decreases. When 2  decreases to 1  (i.e., 2 1   ), 12t  
coincides with both **2t  and 
**
1t . For this extreme case, 12t  becomes the symmetric axis of 
the isocost toll curve, which is composed of left half of the isocost toll curve for group 2 and 
right half of the isocost toll curve for group 1. Accordingly, the resultant total queuing delay is 
half of NT  in Eq. (C.2), and the total eliminated queuing delay is also just half of   in Eq. 
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(C.3). The queuing removal rate QRR  thus remains to be 3
3
. To sum up, as 1 2     , 
the queuing removal rate QRR  would exceed 3
3
, which is the QRR under the two extreme 
cases: 2  is, respectively, infinitely close to its upper bound   and its lower bound 1 . 
This completes this proof of this proposition. 
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Table 1 The optimal solutions for single-step and two-step toll schemes for activity-based 
bottleneck model with linear marginal activity utilities. 
Tolling 
scheme 
Step toll i  
Charging duration 
for each step 
Queuing removal rate 
NTQRR
   
Single-step 1 max
2
3
    1 1 33
Nt t
s
    3 0.577
3
  
Two-step 
1 max max
8 2 3 0.819
9 2 3
    
2 max max
6 2 3 0.458
9 2 3
      
1 1
1 0.425
9 2 3
N Nt t
s s
   

, 
2 1
3 12( ) 0.311
9 2 3
N Nt t
s s
    

 
 3 3-2 9 2 3
0.736
31 12 3
 
 
Note:  2max 28
N
s
      and  3NT 212
N
s
     . 
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Table 2 Optimal solutions of step toll schemes for different scenarios. 
Scenario Condition Optimal tolling time points Optimal step tolls Eliminated queuing delay cost 
I 2 2 1 112
2 1
3 1 3 1
2 2
N Nt
s s
          
 
 
 
 
 
** **
1 1 1
** **
1 1 1
** **
2 2 2
** **
2 2 2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
q
q
q
q
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t






            
     
  
2**
1 1 1
2**
2 2 2
1
3
1
3
q
q
t t
t t

          
       3 3** **1 1 2 22 3 2 39 9I q qs t t s t t           
II 1 1 2 212
1 2
3 1 3 1min ,
2 2
N Nt
s s
              
 
 
   
** **
1 1 1
** **
1 1 1
2 2** ** **
2 12 2 12 2
2
3
3
3
3
2 3
3
q
q
q
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
t





            
  
  
    
2**
1 1 1
**
2 2 2 2 2
1
3
1
2
q
q q
t t
t t t t t

 
               
 
  3**1 12 39II qs t t       
         **2 12 2 2 2 212q qs t t t t t t t              
III 
1 1 2 2
12
1 2
3 1 3 1max ,
2 2
N Nt
s s
               
 
 
   
 
 
2 2** ** **
1 12 1 12 1
1
** **
2 2 2
** **
2 2 2
2 3
3
3
3
3
3
q
q
q
t t t t t t
t
t t t t
t t t t



            
  
    
  
**
1 1 1 1 1
2**
2 2 2
1
2
1
3
q q
q
t t t t t
t t
 
 
               
 
      **1 1 12 1 1 112III q qs t t t t t t t                
       3**2 22 39 qs t t      
IV  1 1 2 212
1 2
3 1 3 1
2 2
N Nt
s s
          
 
   
   
2 2** ** **
1 12 1 12 1
1
2 2** ** **
2 12 2 12 2
2
2 3
3
2 3
3
q
q
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t
t


            
 
    
    
**
1 1 1 1 1
**
2 2 2 2 2
1
2
1
2
q q
q q
t t t t t
t t t t t
 
 
 
                        
 
      **1 1 12 1 1 112IV q qs t t t t t t t               
         **2 12 2 2 2 212q qs t t t t t t t              
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(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
Fig. 1. Equilibrium solution of Vickrey's bottleneck model: (a) departure rate; (b) cumulative 
departures and arrivals; (c) queuing delay time. 
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                 (a)                                      (b) 
 
Fig. 2. Step tolls inscribed in the time-varying toll (Laih, 1994): (a) single-step; (b) two-step. 
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Fig. 3. An example of the morning schedule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                       (b)                       (c) 
 
Fig. 4. Relationships between scheduling utility and scheduling opportunity cost: (a) dt  is 
before **t  and at  is after 
**t ; (b) both dt  and at  are before 
**t ; and (c) both dt  and at  
are after **t . 
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                 (a)                                     (b) 
 
Fig. 5. Marginal home and work activity utilities: (a) constant; (b) linear. 
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(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
Fig. 6. No-toll equilibrium during the morning commute: (a) departure rate; (b) cumulative 
departures and cumulative arrivals; (c) queuing delay time. 
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Fig. 7. The single-step toll system inscribed in time-varying toll curve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. The m-step toll system inscribed in time-varying toll curve. 
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Fig. 9. The two-step toll system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. The three-step toll system. 
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                 (a)                                     (b) 
 
Fig. 11. Isocost queuing curves for two groups of commuters: (a) two curves isolate; (b) two 
curves intersect. 
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                 (c)                                     (d) 
 
Fig. 12. Isocost time-varying tolling curves and four scenarios for step toll schemes: (a) 
Scenario I with 2 12 1t t t
   ; (b) Scenario II with 12 1 2min( , )t t t  ; (c) Scenario III with 
12 1 2max( , )t t t
  ; (d) Scenario IV with 1 12 2t t t   . 
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                   (a)                                      (b)                                     (c) 
Fig. 13. Effects of 2  on optimal step toll scheme for 2 4000N  : (a) 2 50  ; (b) 2 40  ; and (c) 2 25  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                   (a)                                      (b)                                     (c) 
Fig. 14. Effects of 2  on optimal step toll scheme for 2 6000N  : (a) 2 50  ; (b) 2 47  ; and (c) 2 40  . 
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Fig. 15. Changes of step toll models adopted with value of 2  for different demand levels of 
group 2. 
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